Long Arm Jurisdiction

By Michael P. Sampson (part 5 of 8) First Prong: Is Personal Jurisdiction Over the Corporation or Entity Appropriate Under Florida’s Long Arm Statute? The first prong of the two-pronged test for bringing a foreign corporation or trust into a Florida family law action is establishing long-arm personal jurisdiction. Does the family law pleading allege specific or general jurisdiction? Long-arm jurisdiction over a foreign corporation or entity a spouse names in a family law matter may be specific or general. Jurisdiction – Specific or General? First, specific jurisdiction under sections 48.193(1)(a)-(h), Florida Statutes attaches where the defendant entity either “personally or through an agent does any of the acts” enumerated in those subsections. See also Murphy v. Murphy, 342 So. 3d 799 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (dismissing ex-wife’s action to domesticate and enforce Hawaiian divorce decree against nonresident ex-husband, for failure to establish specific or general personal jurisdiction). In contrast, general jurisdiction under section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes lies where the nonresident is “engaged in substantial and not isolated activity.” Such activity must be present activity, not past or speculative activity. See Murphy v. Murphy. Specific Jurisdiction: Acts Subjecting Entity to Florida’s Jurisdiction An entity that personally or through an agent does certain acts submits itself to the jurisdiction of the courts of Florida for any action arising from the acts. Fla. Stat. §§48.193(1)(a) 1-9. These acts include: (a) The entity was engaged in solicitation or service activities within Florida (48.193(1)(a)6.a); or (b) Products, materials, or things processed, serviced, or manufactured by the entity anywhere were used or consumed within Florida in the ordinary course of commerce, trade, or use (48.193(1)(a)6.b). Seek Dismissal If Suing Spouse Fails to Allege Sufficient Facts to Support Specific Jurisdiction Insufficiently alleging jurisdictional facts against an entity gives grounds for dismissal in the family action. See Fishman, Inc. v. Fishman, 657 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Hollowell v. Tamburro, 991 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). In Fishman, the trial court should have dismissed wife’s claims against husband’s three out-of-state corporations. Her petition failed to allege a legally sufficient basis for Florida to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over the corporations. Dismissal When Pleadings Allege No Sufficient Basis for Personal Jurisdiction Other cases support dismissal when a party fails to allege a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. For example, see Murphy v. Murphy, 342 So. 3d 799 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (ex-wife alleged no basis for long-arm jurisdiction over nonresident ex-husband). Likewise, in Rollet v. de Bizemont, 159 So. 3d 351 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), the court reversed denial of nonresident husband’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The pleadings insufficiently alleged a basis for personal jurisdiction over him. General jurisdiction: What is Substantial and Not Isolated Activity? Florida courts have jurisdiction over a foreign entity engaged in “substantial and not isolated activity” within Florida. It doesn’t matter if the activity is interstate, intrastate, or otherwise. Moreover, it doesn’t matter if the claim arises from that activity.  In Florida, substantial and not isolated activity means “continuous and systematic general business contact” with Florida. Caiazzo v. American Royal Arts, Corp., 73 So. 3d 245 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). See also Olson v. Robbie, 141 So. 3d 636 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014); Vos, B.V. v. Payen, 15 So. 3d 734 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009); Gadea v. Star Cruises, Ltd., 949 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).  Standard for Establishing General Jurisdiction is More Demanding Than Specific Jurisdiction The standard for establishing general personal jurisdiction is more demanding than the standard for establishing specific personal jurisdiction.  “General jurisdiction requires far more wide-ranging contacts with the forum state than specific jurisdiction, and it is thus more difficult to establish” Canale v. Rubin, 20 So. 3d 463, 467 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). If a plaintiff fails to meet the due process test for specific jurisdiction, the test for general jurisdiction will rarely be met. Marina Dodge, Inc. v. Quinn, 134 So. 3d 1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). Section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes requires no connection between a petitioner’s claim and the foreign defendant’s Florida activities. Vos, B.V. v. Payen, 15 So. 3d 734 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009).  General Jurisdiction under Long-Arm Statute: Extensive and Pervasive Current Substantial and Not Isolated Activity For general jurisdiction, Florida’s long-arm statute requires it be based on current (not exclusively past) substantial and not isolated activity. Murphy v. Murphy, 342 So. 3d 799 (Fla. 1st DCA Jul 6, 2022); Heineken v. Heineken, 683 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996); Gibbons v. Brown, 716 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Grammar Rules – General Long-Arm Jurisdiction – Defendant Is Engaged in Substantial, Not Isolated Activity in Florida Following grammar rules, the Murphy court read the long-arm statute as requiring jurisdiction to be based on current (not exclusively past) substantial and not isolated activity. Section 48.193(2), Florida Statutes says general jurisdiction lies over a defendant “who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state.” (Emphasis added). There, the former wife failed to establish not only her nonresident former husband’s “extensive and pervasive” contacts with Florida, but also that he currently maintained those contacts with Florida at the time she filed suit. We say this because the linking verb in the statutory provision that we highlighted in the prior paragraph (viz.: “is engaged”) is in the present tense. It is part of an adjective clause that begins with the relative pronoun serving as the subject of the clause—“who.” That clause altogether modifies the antecedent of “who,” which is “a defendant.” This adjective clause, stated in the present tense, thereby describes the type of defendant subject to general jurisdiction in subsection (2). That is to say, because the verb “is” links the past participle “engaged”—operating here as a subject complement—to the relative pronoun it modifies—“who”—the clause effectively links “engaged” (in the present tense) to the defendant being described. This means, in turn, that jurisdiction must be based on current (not exclusively past) “substantial and not isolated activity” within Florida. Murphy v. Murphy, 342 So. 3d 799 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022).  General Jurisdiction: Other Cases on Continuous, Systematic Activity Many cases discuss general long-arm jurisdiction. What level of activity is sufficient for general jurisdiction to